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Tethered to the Statute: How the Third Circuit’s Narrow 
Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Will Shape the Future 
of Cost-Shifting and E-Discovery for the Better  
I. Introduction 
Discovery has grown by orders of magnitude since the advent of the 
computer. Once, the largest of cases required a team of legal professionals 
to pore through tens of thousands of paper documents to find responsive 
discovery. Now, word-processing, e-mail, and ever-expanding databases 
ensure that the same team will face millions upon millions of potentially 
disclosable documents.1 Thankfully, the same computers that generate such 
masses of information make sifting through those masses during discovery 
much easier.2 Computers can do only what they are told to do, however, 
and lawyers often lack the technical understanding to exploit computers’ 
potential without help.3 Thus, as a new world of electronic discovery (e-
discovery) emerges, lawyers must seek assistance from those outside the 
legal profession.  
Enter the e-discovery vendor, a third party hired to handle the technical 
aspects of e-discovery. These experts are hired by law firms, or even by the 
parties themselves, to “collect, process, set up for review, and produce” 
electronically stored information (ESI).4 ESI includes, but is not limited to, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. There are estimates that the amount of stored, discoverable data that an average 
company retains will double every three years. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, PROLIFERATION OF 
“ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION” (ESI) AND REIMBURSABLE PRIVATE CLOUD 
COMPUTING COSTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/2011 
0721073226_large.pdf. 
 2. Right now, for example, major strides are being made in the acceptance and use of 
predictive coding, a way to automate part of the discovery process by having human 
reviewers teach a computer to find responsive documents. See Adam M. Acosta, Predictive 
Coding: The Beginning of a New E-Discovery Era, RES GESTAE, Oct. 2012, at 8, 8.   
 3. As electronic discovery specialist Dennis Kiker said when predicting the rise of 
malpractice suits for electronic discovery mistakes, “Not even IT professionals pretend to 
understand all of the different information systems that exist in a single company. Do we 
really expect every trial attorney to have greater expertise and understanding than the 
professionals that work in the field every day?” Doug Austin, eDiscovery Trends: Is 
eDiscovery Malpractice More Widespread Than You Think?, EDISCOVERY DAILY BLOG 
(July 6, 2011), http://www.ediscoverydaily.com/2011/07/ediscovery-trends-is-ediscovery-
malpractice-more-widespread-than-you-think.html.  
 4. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DESKBOOK § 3:5.3 (Thomas Y. Allman et al. eds., 2012), 
available at Westlaw PLIREF-EDDBK. For a thorough, though now slightly outdated, look 
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e-mails, documents, databases, web pages, any information stored on 
removable memory (e.g., flash drives), and any information held on a cloud 
server.5 Many e-discovery vendors can also perform computer forensics, 
data recovery, and a host of other tasks that a party may need.6 In a very 
real sense, the e-discovery vendor fills a similar role in the digital world 
that the team of document reviewers did in the world of paper. 
To the dismay of those paying the legal bills, the services of an e-
discovery vendor can be expensive.7 Clients have always been cost-
conscious, but the recent economic downturn has increased the pressure on 
lawyers to save money wherever possible.8 Some have looked to their own 
financial structures for answers, attempting alternative billing arrangements 
or outsourcing as methods for cost-saving.9 Others have formulated a much 
simpler solution: make the losing party pay.10 Unfortunately, the American 
Rule requires each party to pay its own litigation expenses, denying the 
opportunity for cost-shifting.11 Thus, the American Rule presents a 
potentially insurmountable barrier to this simple solution.  
                                                                                                                 
at the different services that an e-discovery vendor might offer, see MATTHEW I. COHEN ET 
AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE SELECTION OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY VENDORS: NAVIGATING 
THE VENDOR PROPOSAL PROCESS 21-25 (June 2007 version), available at https://thesedona 
conference.org/download-pub/80.  
 5. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES, & ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, MANAGING 
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 2 (2d ed. 2012), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt2d_eb.pdf/$file/eldscpkt2d_ 
eb.pdf. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define ESI expansively as “including writings, 
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data 
compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 34(a)(1)(A).  
 6. COHEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 21-25.  
 7. In 2010, one thousand of the largest companies in the United States expected to 
spend approximately $1.3 billion dollars on e-discovery costs as part of their corporate 
litigation efforts. See Nathan Koppel, Business Technology: Using Software to Sift Digital 
Records—Looking to Pare Litigation Costs, Firms Use Technology to Find Relevant 
Electronic Documents in Legal Discovery Process, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2010, at B6. 
 8. Ed Poll, Legal Fees: How to Address the Client Pressure to Lower Fees, ABA LAW 
PRACTICE TODAY (May 2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/fin05091.shtml.  
 9. See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Facing the Alternative: How Does a Flat Fee System 
Really Work?, ABA J., Mar. 2012, at 40; Paul Lippe, Want Quality? Learn to Operate, 
LEGAL REBELS (July 26, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/the_ 
age_of_operational_law/. 
 10. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 159-60 (3d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975) (noting that Congress’s approach to the 
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However, the law includes exceptions to the American Rule, one of 
which is 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This statute allows the victorious party to 
recoup some of the “relatively minor, incidental expenses” of litigation.12 
Few of the statute’s drafters likely foresaw its provisions’ effects as 
applying to anything like e-discovery vendors; the statute has existed in 
some form for more than a century.13 Yet, some parties now argue that e-
discovery vendor costs can be placed on the losing party under § 1920(4),14 
which allows the winner to recover “the costs of making copies of any 
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”15 
Prior to the computer revolution, courts understandably interpreted this 
provision as referring to the cost of making physical copies of documents, 
meaning the cost of paper.16 However, as the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
noted, “The law is not static and requires lawyers to push its boundaries, 
including seeking change therein.”17 Enterprising attorneys have attempted 
to capitalize on the shifting technological landscape by framing the services 
of e-discovery vendors as “the 21st Century equivalent of making copies.”18 
If accepted, their argument would place the high costs of both parties’ e-
discovery squarely on the loser. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected this expansive 
argument in Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.19 With 
the American Rule as an ever-present background to its statutory analysis, 
the Third Circuit limited the applicability of § 1920(4) with regard to e-
                                                                                                                 
American Rule has been to “carve out specific exceptions” rather than to give courts 
discretion to shift costs based on the facts of a case). 
 12. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012). 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. E.g., Brief of Appellee Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. at 16-18, Race Tires Am., Inc. v. 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012) (No. 
11-2316), 2011 WL 4351546, at *16-*18; Principal and Response Brief of Defendants-Cross 
Appellants Cisco Ironport Sys., LLC and Return Path, Inc. at 52-54, CBT Flint Partners, 
LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2010-1202, 2010-1203), 2010 WL 3950006, at *52-*54.  
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012).  
 16. E.g., Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 696 F.2d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1982); Roberts 
v. Charter Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 112 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
 17. Flowers v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 897 (Tenn. 2010) 
(discussing the ethics underlying the requirement that lawyers advocate zealously for their 
clients).  
 18. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 19. 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
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discovery.20 It concluded that only a few of the services performed by the e-
discovery vendor fell within the meaning of § 1920(4); the bulk of the 
vendors’ services remained outside the statute.21 The Third Circuit’s narrow 
ruling is an accurate analysis of both the precedent and policy surrounding 
cost-shifting and § 1920, and it should become the prototype for federal 
courts’ treatment of future cases. 
This Note explores the Third Circuit’s ruling and, in so doing, 
demonstrates why it is both legally sound and likely to become the majority 
view across the country. Part II presents the existing policy and statutes 
underlying the taxation of copying costs. Part III discusses the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Race Tires, including the factual and procedural 
background. Part IV follows the Third Circuit’s analysis of the law, 
showing how it comports with the Supreme Court’s opinions on § 1920 and 
is supported by other precedents and policies. Part V predicts how other 
courts will view Race Tires based on their own precedents and discusses the 
potentially negative implications of the Third Circuit’s ruling for the legal 
community.  
II. Summary of Existing Law: The Rules and Policies at Play 
Both the American Rule and exceptions like 28 U.S.C. § 1920 are the 
product of centuries of American jurisprudence and tradition, stretching 
back as far as the early days of the Supreme Court.22 Understanding the 
American Rule and its place in federal court is central to understanding the 
Third Circuit’s ruling in Race Tires and, moreover, why that ruling is 
correct.  
A. Foundation: How the American Rule Affects Potential Cost-Shifting 
The American Rule’s prohibition on cost-shifting has rested at the heart 
of any question of costs in the United States almost as long as there has 
been a United States. The American Rule is “[t]he general policy that all 
litigants, even the prevailing one, must bear their own attorney’s fees.”23 
Although it most often appears in the context of suits for attorney’s fees, 
courts interpret the American Rule expansively to encompass most 
expenses of litigation.24 The American Rule breaks from the English Rule, 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 164, 169.  
 21. Id. at 171-72. 
 22. See infra Parts II.A, C. 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009). 
 24. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 678 F.3d 1199, 
1201 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that the American Rule requires all parties to “pay their own 
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which places the burden of the all legal fees on the losing party.25 The 
English Rule, as its name implies, is followed in the United Kingdom as 
well as in most civil law countries.26  
It is unknown precisely when colonial courts began to move away from 
the English tradition, but the Supreme Court settled the matter for federal 
courts in 1796.27 In Arcambel v. Wiseman, where a defeated party objected 
to paying his opponent’s attorney’s fee, the Court wrote:  
We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed. The 
general practice of the United States is in oposition [sic] to it; 
and even if that practice were not strictly correct in principle, it 
is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or 
modified, by statute.28  
The Court has repeatedly upheld the American Rule in later cases.29 
Beginning with its initial ruling in Arcambel, the Court has been incredibly 
wary of allowing any exception to the American Rule that Congress did not 
create.30 
The policies underlying the American Rule are fundamental to the 
American legal system. First and foremost, courts do not want to punish or 
discourage poor parties from bringing suit, especially when “litigation is at 
best uncertain.”31 Were the rule not in place, wealthy litigants could 
intimidate opponents with the fear of being spent out of civil court and into 
bankruptcy court.32 Such a result would violate our long-standing ideal that 
                                                                                                                 
fees and costs in connection with bringing a law suit”); Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
624 F.3d 834, 839-40 (7th Cir. 2010) (differentiating attorney’s fees from costs and other 
expenses). 
 25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (9th ed. 2009). 
 26. Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fie! Foe! Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the English 
Rule Finding the Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 34 (2006). 
 27. For an extensive look at the history of the American Rule in the Supreme Court, see 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975). 
 28. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). 
 29. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 250 (gathering cases). 
 30. Id. at 247 (“[W]e are convinced that it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, 
without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner and to the 
extent urged by respondents . . . .”).  
 31. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
 32. Consider the story of Pauline Hughes, who on appeal lost her negligence suit against 
a group of physicians in connection with her husband’s death during surgery. Having tried 
her case in the United Kingdom, Mrs. Hughes was left with her own attorney’s bill of 
$146,000 and the opposing attorney’s bill of $144,000. See John F. Vargo, The American 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
196 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:191 
 
 
each person should have their day in court.33 Moreover, allowing fees and 
costs would create what the Court has called “a second major litigation” for 
every case,34 with two effects. First, the legal battle over costs would 
necessarily create new, additional legal fees for a party that has already lost 
on the merits. Second, the dispute over costs “would pose substantial 
burdens for judicial administration” by doubling every judge’s caseload.35 
Some commentators nevertheless urge courts to ignore or create judicial 
exceptions to the American Rule.36 Despite these voices, most courts 
continue to follow the American Rule and, like the Supreme Court in 
Arcambel, accept only legislative exceptions. 
B. Bridging the Gap: How Rule 54(d)(1) Connects § 1920(4) to the 
American Rule 
Under most circumstances, the American Rule prevents the majority of 
litigation expenses from being shifted between parties. Yet Congress, 
occasionally with the assistance of the judicial branch, can and has crafted 
specific exceptions to that rule.37 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 has 
contained the exception for litigation costs like copying since the Rules 
were first introduced.38 Rule 54(d)(1) now reads, in pertinent part: “Unless 
a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—
other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”39 
Recall that the Supreme Court in Arcambel required a statute to modify the 
                                                                                                                 
Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1567, 1568-69 (1993).  
 33. Although the origin of the phrase “day in court” remains unclear, it was a regular 
part of the legal discourse by the beginning of the eighteenth century. JAMES E. CLAPP ET AL., 
LAWTALK: THE UNKNOWN STORIES BEHIND FAMILIAR LEGAL EXPRESSIONS 80-81 (2011). 
 34. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). 
 35. Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718. 
 36. E.g., Bungard, supra note 26; James Windon, Fee Shifting in Libel Litigation: How 
the American Approach to Costs Allocation Inhibits the Achievement of Libel Law’s 
Substantive Goals, 3 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 175 (2010). 
 37. For a discussion of allowable exceptions to the American Rule, see Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-62 (1975). 
 38. In the 1940 United States Code, the first to include the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the cost-shifting provision read as follows: “Except when express provision 
therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 54(d) (1940) (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1)).  
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). 
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American Rule.40 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are as much 
statutes as the rest of the United States Code, Rule 54(d)(1) serves as the 
statutory predicate necessary for cost-shifting.41 Although not a major piece 
of Race Tires, Rule 54(d)(1)’s allowance of costs in federal actions 
connects the overarching policy of the American Rule to the specific 
exception at play in the case.  
While Rule 54(d)(1) serves as the statutory exception necessary to set 
aside the American Rule, its language is incredibly vague. Neither the rule 
nor the subsequent comments define what could be considered a “cost.”42 
That definition instead lies in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, the current incarnation of 
one of Congress’s exceptions to the American Rule and the statute at issue 
in Race Tires.43  
C. Exception in Action: How 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) Circumvents the 
American Rule  
Congress began allowing some recovery of litigation costs as part of the 
Act of February 26, 1853, its first major attempt to incorporate an exception 
to the American Rule into statute.44 According to the Supreme Court, 
Congress sought to “standardize the costs allowable in federal litigation” in 
order to prevent “losing litigants . . . [from] being unfairly saddled with 
exorbitant fees.”45 The exception for copying costs became part of the first 
United States Code,46 and Congress retained the substance of the provision 
in the Revised Code of 1948 to ensure “rigid controls on cost-shifting in 
federal courts.”47 The legislature’s most recent interaction with the statute 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.  
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163, 164 (D. Mont. 1948) (holding that 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “have the same force and effect as other statutory 
enactments by Congress”). 
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) and Advisory Committee notes. 
 43. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 163 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 44. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 251-53. 
 45. Id. at 251. 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 830 (1925). The statute allowed “lawful fees for exemplifications and 
copies of papers . . . [to] be included in and form a portion of a judgment or decree against 
the losing party.” Id. 
 47. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 164 (quoting Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 
U.S. 437, 445 (1987)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). It was at this point that the 
exception’s designation became 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 255. 
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came in 2008, when it revised the language to refer to “materials” rather 
than “papers” in recognition of advancing technology.48  
Section 1920(4) seems relatively straightforward, but it hides a 
potentially enormous ambiguity for a digital world. It allows “[a] judge or 
clerk . . . [to] tax as costs . . . [f]ees for exemplification and the costs of 
making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained 
for use in the case.”49 For most of the statute’s existence, the meaning of 
copying was clear—it referred to the creation of a physical duplicate of a 
document.50 The method of creating that duplicate may have changed, most 
notably with the introduction of the modern copy machine,51 but the 
material requirements remained the same: one piece of paper became two 
(roughly) identical pieces of paper. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress “comprehensively 
addressed” the statutory limitations on fees in § 1920 and in a companion 
statute not at issue here.52 However, the introduction of digital documents 
clouded the meaning of “copy,” and the Supreme Court has not examined § 
1920(4) since the digital revolution began.53 Lower courts have split on the 
breadth of the word “copy.” Courts applying the so-called broad 
interpretation allow the winner to recover all or nearly all e-discovery costs, 
while those employing the narrow interpretation limit costs to only a small 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Judicial Administration and Technical Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
406, 122 Stat. 4291. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth considering 
whether the cost to use additive manufacturing (also called “3-D printing”) to create copies 
of physical objects (for exhibits, etc.) could be considered a cost to “mak[e] copies of any 
materials” and, thus, within the bounds of the § 1920. For a primer on the topic, see AM 
Basics, ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING (2013), http://additivemanufacturing.com/basics/. 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012). Although it is fertile ground for contention, the Third 
Circuit did not address the exact meaning of the phrase “necessarily obtained for use in the 
case.” Its ruling is limited solely to interpreting the meaning of the word “copy,” and this 
Note will only address that aspect of the statute. For more information on the topic of 
necessity, see Steven C. Bennett, Are E-Discovery Costs Recoverable by a Prevailing 
Party?, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 537, 545-47 (2010).   
 50. Cf. Fogleman v. ARAMCO (Arabian Am. Oil Co.), 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 
1991) (using the “xerox copy” as the standard for a copied document). 
 51. For an entertaining look at one law professor’s experience with the history of 
modern copying, see David D. Siegel, My Life in Paper, 78 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 46 (2006). 
 52. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 442. The other statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1821, describes 
costs allowable to witnesses for their expenses in being part of a trial (e.g., subsistence, 
mileage, etc.). 
 53. Of the few cases interpreting any part of § 1920, most have dealt with § 1920(3) 
(witness fees) and § 1920(6) (fees for court-appointed experts and interpreters). See, e.g., 
Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 438; Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 
1998 (2012).  
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portion of the total.54 As a result of this confusion, the questions to be 
resolved in Race Tires emerge: what exactly is a copy of a wholly-
electronic document? And more importantly, who should pay for it? 
III. Presentation of the Case: The Running of Race Tires  
A. Preparing for Race Day: The Events Leading to the Third Circuit’s 
Opinion 
Race Tires was a bitterly fought case from beginning to end.55 It began in 
the Western District of Pennsylvania as a relatively straightforward antitrust 
case brought under the Sherman Act.56 Race Tires America (Race), the 
plaintiff in the district court suit, and Hoosier Racing Tire (Hoosier), one of 
the two defendants in the case, were tire suppliers contesting for economic 
victory in the world of competitive motor sports.57 The other named 
defendant, Dirt Motor Sports, Inc. (DMS), was a sanctioning body in the 
racing world.58  
Race brought suit after DMS instituted a “single tire rule” for its races 
and selected Hoosier as its exclusive supplier.59 A single-tire rule, as its 
name suggests, requires all competitors in a particular race to use the same 
brand and type of tire on their vehicles.60 Competition to be the chosen 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Compare, e.g., Windy City Innovations, LLC v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 04 C 4240, 
2006 WL 2224057, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2006) (disallowing fees for optical character 
recognition, document coding, and keyword searching services), and Fast Memory Erase, 
LLC v. Spansion, Inc., No. 3-10-CV-0481-M-BD, 2010 WL 5093945, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 
10, 2010) (disallowing “costs for collecting and processing ESI”), with In re Ricoh Co. 
Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that, absent an agreement 
between the parties, the cost of creating a database is recoverable).  
 55. The district court described the parties as having a “lengthy and contentious” 
history, and it “noted on numerous occasions the considerable tension among the respective 
parties and their attorneys.” Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 660 F. Supp. 
2d 590, 595 (W.D. Pa. 2009). 
 56. Id. at 594.  
 57. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 160 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 596. The Third Circuit discussed in some depth the 
advantages and disadvantages of single-tire rules as compared to “open tire” rules. See Race 
Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 69-72 (3d Cir. 2010). Both the 
district and appellate courts noted that tires were not unusual in being restricted; other racing 
associations have restricted carburetors, mufflers, cylinder heads, and even engines and 
chassis. See id. at 63; Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 597.  
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supplier is understandably fierce, as the supplier gains exclusive access to a 
market that will require a large amount of its product.61 Race and Hoosier 
were among those that submitted bids to DMS for its exclusive contract, 
and DMS chose Hoosier after a thorough investigation of all of the bids.62 
Race estimated its damages as a result of not receiving the contract 
exceeded thirty million dollars.63 That number would triple if the court 
found that Hoosier and DMS violated the Sherman Act.64  
Unfortunately for Race, it would never lay claim to those damages. The 
district court granted summary judgment to both Hoosier and DMS, holding 
that there could be no violation of the Sherman Act where “a sanctioning 
body freely decides to adopt a single tire rule, and then freely selects a 
supplier.”65 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.66 The appellate court expanded on the district court’s reasoning and 
created a bright-line standard for single-product rules and antitrust liability: 
as long as the sanctioning body “freely” chooses its rule and has “sufficient 
pro-competitive or business justifications” for making the rule, there will be 
no antitrust liability for its exclusive contracts with suppliers.67  
As part of litigating the case, the parties made extensive requests for ESI 
from each other.68 The district court’s Case Management Order required the 
parties to agree to a list of search terms for database searches, convert all 
files to Tagged Image File Format (TIFF), produce certain metadata fields, 
and create searchable versions of any text file.69 Each of the parties hired an 
e-discovery vendor to manage its part in the discovery process.70 The court 
accepted Race’s categorization of the vendors’ activities: “(1) preservation 
and collection of ESI; (2) processing the collected ESI; (3) keyword 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 160. 
 62. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 599-600. It is worth noting that Race, though 
unsuccessful in this bid, had received single-tire rule contracts previously. Race Tires, 614 
F.3d at 65. 
 63. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161. 
 64. Any domestic party injured by an antitrust violation can, under the Sherman Act, 
“recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).  
 65. Race Tires, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
 66. Race Tires, 614 F.3d at 85. 
 67. Id. at 81.  
 68. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161.  
 69. Id. “Metadata” is information, sometimes visible and sometimes hidden, that 
provides additional information about the ESI, such as dates of creation and editing, author’s 
or editor’s identity, etc. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. For a glossary of basic e-
discovery terms, see id. at 22-26. 
 70. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 161. 
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searching; (4) culling privileged material; (5) scanning and TIFF 
conversion; (6) optical character recognition (‘OCR’) conversion; and (7) 
conversion of racing videos from VHS format to DVD format.”71 With the 
help of their e-discovery vendors, DMS and Hoosier together produced 
slightly over 600,000 electronic documents in response to Race’s discovery 
requests.72  
While Hoosier and DMS were likely enthusiastic about winning on 
summary judgment, their e-discovery costs undoubtedly tempered their joy. 
Hoosier’s vendor presented a bill for more than $125,000, while DMS’s 
vendor sought almost $330,000.73 Maneuvering for some relief, Hoosier 
and DMS included the vendors’ charges on the bills of costs they presented 
to the district court clerk.74 Following Race’s objection, DMS dropped its 
claim to slightly more than $240,000, stating that its vendor’s invoices 
“were exceedingly confusing and inconsistent.”75 Noting the lack of 
Supreme Court precedent and the circuit split on whether e-discovery costs 
could be considered within the statute,76 the clerk decided to allow almost 
all of the vendors’ bills as costs under § 1920(4) because the vendors’ 
“expertise [was] necessary to retrieve and prepare” the responsive 
documents, making the vendors “an indispensable part of the process.”77  
Understandably, Race appealed the clerk’s decision, which would force 
it to pay over $360,000 to the parties it had just unsuccessfully sued.78 
However, the district court issued a memorandum opinion upholding the 
clerk’s finding.79 The district court, like the clerk, felt that the 
indispensability of the vendors to the e-discovery process brought them 
within the bounds of § 1920(4).80 Race appealed once more, bringing the 
case to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.81 
  
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 161-62.  
 72. Id. at 162.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 162-63.  
 78. Id. at 163.  
 79. Id. The memorandum opinion is styled Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire 
Corp., No. 2:07–cv–1294, 2011 WL 1748620 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011). 
 80. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 163. 
 81. Id. 
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B. It’s Race Day! The Third Circuit’s Opinion Finds the Narrow 
Interpretation Beating the Broad by a Wide Margin 
The Third Circuit’s decision, despite its modern topic, is a fairly standard 
case of statutory interpretation. The court opened the opinion by narrowing 
its gaze to the piece of the § 1920 at issue.82 In interpreting the statute, the 
court defined its terms and then looked to both past precedent and present 
policy for direction.83 The court also examined the common arguments 
given in favor of the broad interpretation of the statute, but it found those 
arguments “untethered from the statutory mooring.”84 The Third Circuit 
concluded that the narrow interpretation of the statute was correct and 
prevented Hoosier and DMS from recovering most of their e-discovery 
costs.85 
1. Pole Position: The Third Circuit Resolves Preliminary Matters  
The court began its inquiry by focusing on the specific language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1920(4) at issue. The statute allows a court to award “[f]ees for 
exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials.”86 No 
party’s brief distinguished between exemplification and copying, despite 
the “well-established canon of statutory interpretation” that Congress’s use 
of different words in a statute signals its intent for those words to have 
different meanings.87 Like copying, the Supreme Court has not defined 
exemplification, and lower courts are split as to its meaning.88 The Federal 
Circuit, applying the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation, found 
exemplification to be “an official transcript of a public record, authenticated 
as a true copy for use as evidence.”89 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit has 
followed a broad interpretation, ruling that exemplification fees could be 
awarded for the cost to create any exhibit “[s]o long as the means of 
presentation furthers the illustrative purpose of [the] exhibit.”90 The Third 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at 165-66. 
 83. Id. at 163-65. 
 84. Id. at 169.  
 85. Id. at 171. 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012). 
 87. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 165 (citing SEC v. McCarthy, 332 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 
2003)). 
 88. Id. at 159. 
 89. Kohus v. Cosco, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 593 (7th ed. 1999)) (refusing under Sixth Circuit precedent to award costs for 
creating a video exhibit).  
 90. Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 428 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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Circuit found, however, that there was no possible definition of 
exemplification that could apply to the case at bar, ending its consideration 
of the issue.91 
The Third Circuit also saw fit to address a small but important 
procedural aspect of § 1920 before beginning its analysis.92 Seemingly 
exasperated, the court chastised Hoosier and DMS for the “lack of 
specificity and clarity” in their bills of costs.93 In the context of awards for 
attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court stated that the party seeking fees has the 
burden of demonstrating its claim.94 In some circuits, this language has 
been taken to mean that the bill’s proponent should provide “an itemized 
list with sufficient specificity” to allow the clerk or court to understand how 
the cost is within one of the allowable categories.95 Both vendors’ invoices 
included pseudo-technical terms like “EDD Processing” and “Performing 
Searching/Filtering/Exporting” that tried to hide the invoices’ lack of actual 
information about the vendors’ services.96 The Third Circuit did not 
approve.97 It also took issue with the fact that neither invoice included 
either a rationale for the vendors’ activities or any measure of results.98 The 
court eventually accepted Race’s categorization of the vendors’ services in 
order to move forward with its analysis.99 However, the implication of this 
section of the opinion is that the court will expect the same level of detail 
from vendors seeking fees that it does from attorneys.100 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166. Given the methods it used to define copying, the Third 
Circuit would likely follow the Sixth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of exemplification.  
 92. Id. at 166-67. 
 93. Id. at 166. 
 94. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 
 95. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10–03561 WHA, 2012 WL 3822129, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) (citing In re Ricoh Co. Ltd. Patent Litigation, 661 F.3d 1361, 1368 
(Fed. Cir 2011). 
 96. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 167. 
 97. Id. at 166. 
 98. Id. at 167. 
 99. Id. 
 100. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court held that an attorney seeking a fee must 
“exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked” and “maintain billing time 
records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims.” 461 U.S. 
424, 437 (1983). In the Third Circuit, courts have a duty to “exclude from counsel’s fee 
request ‘hours that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’” Holmes v. 
Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 595 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 
434). Interestingly, in broad interpretation jurisdictions the need to create a detailed fee 
request under § 1920(4) could spawn the “second major litigation” that the Supreme Court 
wanted to avoid in Hensley, except the litigation would be between the vendor with an 
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2. Green Flag: The Third Circuit Starts Its Analytical Engines 
With frustration vented and focus narrowed, the Third Circuit began its 
statutory analysis by defining a “copy” in the context of § 1920(4).101 It 
adopted the definition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
where a copy is “an imitation, transcript, or reproduction of an original 
work.”102 The definition’s most important feature is the emphasis placed on 
duality; there can only be a copy when there is an original. The Third 
Circuit referenced the photocopy as a prominent example of an allowable 
copy.103 Although a simple point, the rest of Race Tires—indeed, the 
entirety of the narrow interpretation—can be framed as the characterization 
of a specific e-discovery activity as one of two acts: finding an original; or 
creating a copy of that original. Under the Third Circuit’s definition, only 
the latter is within the scope of § 1920(4). 
Based on its definition, the Third Circuit allowed costs for those 
activities within the scope of the statute under the narrow interpretation 
(which, unsurprisingly, are also allowed under the broad interpretation).104 
The court maintained that scanning hard-copy documents to create digital 
versions and converting files from their native format to the court-
prescribed production format fell within the statute.105 Additionally, the 
Third Circuit allowed the costs to reformat VHS recordings as DVD 
recordings, presumably as a type of format conversion.106  
The court did not emphasize the point, but broad interpretation courts 
often argue that all of the services of e-discovery vendors are “the 21st 
Century equivalent of making copies.”107 By allowing these specific costs, 
the Third Circuit agreed that there are electronic equivalents to making 
copies but limited them to format conversion and document scanning 
                                                                                                                 
unclear invoice and the employer who, because of that invoice, could not recover its costs. 
461 U.S. at 437. 
 101. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166. 
 102. Id. Nearly identical, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a copy as “[a]n imitation or 
reproduction of an original.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (9th ed. 2009). 
 103. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 166. 
 104. Id. at 167. 
 105. Id. (citing Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009); BDT Prods., 
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 420 (6th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012); Brown v. McGraw-
Hill Cos., 526 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (N.D. Iowa 2007)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
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only.108 This restriction comports with its definition of a copy, a duplicate 
of an original, because both scanning and converting documents clearly 
begin with a single document and result in an exact reproduction of that 
document.  
3. Red Flag: The Third Circuit Finds the Broad Interpretation Divorced 
from the Statute 
Having adopted a meaning of copying, the Third Circuit’s remaining 
task was to determine whether the broad or narrow interpretation of § 
1920(4) more closely aligned with its definition.  
The Third Circuit focused its analysis on the statute’s language, rejecting 
the broad interpretation argument that the complexity of the services made 
them taxable.109 Broad interpretation courts have made the complex nature 
of e-discovery services their touchstone, emphasizing a pair of policy 
considerations tied to that complexity. First, modern e-discovery requires 
technical expertise well beyond that of most lawyers.110 As a result, the e-
discovery vendor is indispensable to the discovery phase of the case being 
completed.111 Second, using an expert as part of the discovery process can 
be a major cost savings for the parties, so courts should encourage their 
use.112 As a corollary, some courts maintain that shifting vendor costs also 
serves as an effective limit on parties’ unreasonable discovery requests.113  
The Third Circuit found the entire broad interpretation to be “untethered 
from the statutory mooring.”114 The court drew a sharp distinction between 
permitted, taxable activities and the preliminary steps that make such 
activities possible.115 Although the court opined that ESI may need 
“extensive ‘processing’ . . . to make a comprehensive and intelligible 
production,” it stated that the statute “does not authorize taxation merely 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169-70. 
 109. Id. at 169. 
 110. See Austin, supra note 3. The district court in Race Tires supported this aspect of the 
broad interpretation, finding e-discovery “‘highly technical’ . . . [and] not ‘the type of 
services that attorneys or paralegals are trained for or are capable of providing.’” Race Tires, 
674 F.3d at 168 (quoting Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., No. 2:07–cv–
1294, 2011 WL 178620, at *9 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 2011)). 
 111. CBT Flint, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (“The services [of an e-discovery vendor] are 
certainly necessary in the electronic age. The enormous burden and expense of electronic 
discovery are well known.”). 
 112. See In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 113. CBT Flint, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1381. 
 114. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169.  
 115. Id.  
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because today’s technology requires technical expertise not ordinarily 
possessed by the typical legal professional.”116 The court’s position accords 
with pre-digital interpretations of the statute, which did not award costs for 
document review even when the responsive documents were later copied.117 
The Third Circuit concluded that “Congress did not authorize taxation of 
charges necessarily incurred to discharge discovery obligations. It allowed 
only for the taxation of the costs of making copies.”118  
4. Checkered Flag: The Third Circuit Adopts the Narrow Interpretation 
Although Hoosier and DMS made a few additional arguments in favor of 
being awarded costs, the Third Circuit found these arguments unimportant 
and dismissed them with little discussion.119 Hoosier argued that the costs 
of producing and the costs of copying discovery ESI could not be separated, 
so all should be allowed.120 The circuit court pointed to other courts that 
have separated the two and noted that it is the proponent’s burden to prove 
that a cost fits within the statutory structure.121 The court also found 
insignificant the argument that the provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for e-discovery somehow brought production of e-discovery 
within the bounds of § 1920(4).122  
Ultimately, the court allowed only $30,370.42 in costs, less than one-
tenth of the approximately $365,000 Hoosier and DMS sought.123 The 
award covered only the costs of scanning paper documents to create 
electronic versions and converting documents and videos from their native 
format to the agreed-upon production format.124 The court disallowed all of 
the costs associated with producing the discovery, as they did not fall 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. It is worth noting that modern cases, especially involving e-discovery on the 
scale of Race Tires, almost certainly will require processing from a specialist. As noted in 
Part I above, modern parties are generating too much ESI for traditional discovery processes 
to be feasible. And while some companies may have employees with the necessary technical 
expertise, the majority will likely need to hire an outside vendor to manage the e-discovery 
process. 
 117. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ees 
are permitted only for the physical preparation and duplication of documents, not the 
intellectual effort involved in their production.”), abrogated on other grounds by Townsend 
v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 118. Race Tires, 674 F.3d at 169. 
 119. Id. at 170-71. 
 120. Id. at 170. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 170-71.  
 123. Id. at 171.  
 124. Id.  
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within § 1920(4).125 In doing so, it rejected the broad interpretation in favor 
of what it saw as the interpretation more closely aligned with the definition 
of copying.126 
IV. After the Race Is Run: Analysis of the Narrow Interpretation in Light of 
the Third Circuit’s Opinion 
 The narrow interpretation of § 1920(4), as exemplified by the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Race Tires, aptly applies the classical, accepted 
understanding of cost-shifting to modern e-discovery. Most importantly, the 
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) echoes Supreme Court opinions on 
similar topics. It also melds with several of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure applicable to discovery, a point the Third Circuit did not explore. 
Finally, the narrow interpretation avoids the trap of technological fear by 
rejecting ignorance and requiring both judges and practitioners to 
understand e-discovery. It is by far the better of the two interpretations of § 
1920(4) and should be adopted wholesale by U.S. courts. 
A. The Narrow Interpretation Mimics Supreme Court Decision Making on § 
1920 
The Third Circuit’s narrow interpretation aligns well with the Supreme 
Court’s opinions on cost-shifting and the American Rule. In a recent 
opinion, the Court held that Congress intended the taxable costs allowed 
under § 1920 to be “modest in scope” rather than major exceptions.127 The 
narrow interpretation, which essentially allows only minor cost-shifting, fits 
firmly within this limited philosophy of the American Rule. Moreover, the 
Court has unequivocally stated that, when it comes to cost-shifting and § 
1920, lower courts have little discretion.128 Instead, courts are strictly 
limited to the express provisions of the cost-shifting statute.129 If it were to 
take a case on § 1920(4), the Supreme Court would likely find the latitude 
of the broad interpretation to be so far from that position as to be ludicrous. 
By contrast, the Court would likely view the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Race Tires, and the narrow interpretation as a whole, as the logical 
extension of its past precedent on cost-shifting and the American Rule. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 171-72. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012). 
 128. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442-43 (1987). 
 129. Id. at 445. 
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The Third Circuit’s methodology in deciding the case was 
extraordinarily similar to that used by the Supreme Court in its recent 
interpretation of § 1920, and thus it would likely be upheld on appeal. 
While the Court has not recently examined § 1920(4), two months after the 
Third Circuit handed down its decision the Court interpreted § 1920(6) in 
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.130 In that case, the Supreme Court 
needed to define “interpreter” in order to apply the cost-shifting statute.131 
The Court first surveyed modern dictionaries in an effort to find the term’s 
“ordinary meaning.”132 Having done so, the Court then reviewed the history 
and context of the statute as well as how prior courts had enforced the 
phrase in order to determine whether the word had a meaning outside of the 
ordinary.133 Finally, it applied its definition to the facts of the case at bar.134 
Although the issue was not framed in exactly the same way, the Third 
Circuit followed a similar pattern in deciding Race Tires. The fact that the 
Third Circuit’s decision so closely parallels the higher court’s suggests that 
the Third Circuit’s process for arriving at the narrow interpretation was 
likely correct. When taken together, the two cases present a template for 
future courts to use when interpreting § 1920. 
B. An Unexplored Connection Between the Narrow Interpretation and Rule 
34 
Although not discussed by the Third Circuit, the narrow interpretation of 
§ 1920(4) and Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure share an 
interesting and unexpected symmetry. Rule 34 states that a responding 
party must “produce and permit the requesting party . . . to inspect, copy, 
test, or sample” any responsive discovery.135 Producing responsive 
discovery documents is part of the responding party’s Rule 34 duty to 
respond.136 As a cost of litigation, the American Rule would therefore 
require the responding party to pay the associated expenses, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Taniguchi, 132 S. Ct. at 1997. Section 1920(6) allows a court to award as costs 
“[c]ompensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, 
expenses, and costs of special interpretation services.” Id. at 2002. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (citing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995)).  
 133. Id. at 2004-05.  
 134. Id. at 2006-07. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 136. According to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B), a party’s response “must either state that 
inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the 
request, including the reasons.” Thus, the responding party’s actions are limited to either 
acquiescence or objection, nothing more.  
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collection and review tasks e-discovery vendors commonly perform.137 
However, nothing in Rule 34 requires delivery of a copy of the responsive 
discovery to the requesting party, only that the responding party make the 
discovery available.138 The Rule allows copying, but it implies that the 
requesting party, not the responding party, is the one who will actually 
make the copy.139 Just as it places the cost of production on the responding 
party, Rule 34 seems to place the cost of transmission squarely on the 
requesting party.140 
In this, Rule 34 seems to match the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4). 
The production requirement in Rule 34 does not distinguish between 
whether the document is physical or electronic.141 Neither does the Third 
Circuit’s narrow interpretation of § 1920(4).142 In either case, only those 
costs associated with transmitting the document to the requesting party (i.e., 
those beyond the minimal requirements of Rule 34) are recoverable. Thus, 
under both Rule 34 and § 1920(4) many of the costs associated with e-
discovery vendors—including the data extraction, processing, and 
searching done by Hoosier’s and DMS’s vendors—are the responsibility of 
the responding party.143 The fact that it is the e-discovery vendor, and not 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“[T]he presumption 
is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests.”).  
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Section 1920(4), viewed in the light of Rule 34, creates an exception to the 
American Rule that is, in reality, the reverse of what it appears on the surface. At first 
glance, it seems like § 1920(4) allows a suit’s winner to recover the money it spent on 
copying from the loser, which the American Rule normally would not permit. However, 
when reading Rule 34 it seems clear that each party’s cost of making copies during 
discovery is in fact a litigation expense for the other party. Conceptually, the American Rule 
would always require the losing party to pay the winner for those expenses because, 
although the losing party asked the winning party to make the copies and bear the costs until 
the end of the case, the ultimate expense always belonged to the losing party. The Rule does 
not actually require either party to repay what the other party spent complying with 
discovery requests. Where § 1920(4) is an exception to the American Rule, then, is in 
denying the loser the opportunity to seek recompense from the winner. 
 141. While Rule 34 does give additional requirements for requests of ESI in subsection 
(b)(2)(D), the basic requirements for producing both electronic and paper documents are the 
same. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).  
 142. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 143. As Judge Rosenthal noted in Kellogg Brown & Root Intern., Inc. v. Altanmia 
Commercial Mktg. Co., such acts are “more like the work of an attorney or legal assistant in 
locating and segregating documents that may be responsive to discovery than it is like 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
210 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:191 
 
 
the attorney, who is producing the discovery is irrelevant; cost-shifting is 
allowable only for acts involved in transmitting discovery from responding 
to requesting parties. There is no evidence that the drafters of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure had § 1920(4) in mind when they updated Rule 34 to 
include e-discovery,144 so there is no way to determine if the harmony 
between statute and Rule is more than coincidence. If nothing else, though, 
the degree of symmetry between the two lends additional, correlative 
support for the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4). 
C. The Fear of Technology Is Not a Sound Basis for Decision 
Perhaps implicit in the Third Circuit’s argument is a condemnation of 
broad interpretation courts that awarded costs based on an unwillingness to 
face the changing technological landscape. The policies on which the broad 
interpretation is based—expertise beyond the lawyer’s ken, cost savings, 
and controlling discovery—are conspicuously absent from the language of 
the statute, yet courts found them persuasive nevertheless.145 The difference 
may lie in how very alien new technology can be, as illustrated by analogy. 
In the pre-digital world, a lawyer with no understanding of the Dewey 
Decimal System may have needed the assistance of an experienced librarian 
in order to locate and copy books in a library, but no one would have 
argued that the librarian’s efforts were taxable under § 1920(4). Even one 
unfamiliar with finding books in a library would know that the librarian was 
not involved in the act of copying, only in finding the materials to be 
copied. The same likely was not true for e-discovery, especially given the 
legal profession’s notoriety for refusing to adopt modern technology in 
favor of cherished archaisms.146 It may have been easier simply to call 
                                                                                                                 
copying those documents for use in a case.” Civ. Action No. H-07-2684, 2009 WL 1457632, 
at *5 (S.D. Tex. May 26, 2009). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 and Advisory Committee notes. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Some judges are notorious for not fully understanding, much less embracing, 
changes in technology. Although accepted now, even innocuous courtroom technology like 
digital projectors faced stiff opposition from the bench when initially introduced. Stan 
Gibson, Evolving Courtroom Technology, GPSOLO TECHNOLOGY & PRACTICE GUIDE (June 
2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_so 
lo_magazine_index/courtroomtechnology.html. Justice Breyer has spoken openly about the 
need for judges to understand modern technology, pointing to examples of his own and other 
high court justices’ misunderstandings of modern technology. Erik Shelzig, Supreme Court 
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everything “the 21st Century equivalent of making copies” than to dig into 
the expanding, and confounding, world of ESI.147 However, the emerging 
world of e-discovery requires the same careful consideration given to more 
traditional legal issues, even though it is likely unfamiliar. Both lawyers 
and judges must banish their fear and expand their knowledge of this new 
area in order to give parties good counsel and sound decisions.  
As the Third Circuit explained, neither the language of the statute, nor its 
history and context would support the adoption of anything but the narrow 
interpretation.148 The broad interpretation, appealing though it may be, is 
fundamentally flawed because its underlying policy concerns have no basis 
in the language of the statute. The narrow interpretation, on the other hand, 
is rooted in both the tradition of the American Rule and the current 
language of § 1920. Moreover, the language of Rule 34 gives additional 
support to the narrow interpretation. Although Hoosier and DMS 
undoubtedly hoped for a different outcome, the Third Circuit’s decision is 
the best possible interpretation of § 1920(4).  
V. The Post-Race Press Conference: The State of § 1920(4) After Race 
Tires  
The real question following any major case is a simple one: What 
happens now? For the parties seeking costs in Race Tires, they are left with 
the bill for their e-discovery vendors, slightly souring an otherwise 
impressive victory on the merits. But for the legal community as a whole, 
the Third Circuit’s opinion returns an old paradigm to a new world, creating 
uncertainty. This section addresses some of the varied consequences of 
Race Tires, including the likelihood of its adoption in other circuits and 
new areas of concern for clients and attorneys in those circuits where it is 
adopted.  
A. The Adoption of Race Tires in Other Circuits 
Despite the logic of the Race Tires opinion, the holding is binding law 
only on the Third Circuit and related lower courts. The Supreme Court 
denied certiorari on appeal,149 with two effects: First, Race Tires remains 
good law in the Third Circuit. And second, the chance to create national 
                                                                                                                 
 147. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 
2009), vacated, 654 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 148. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).  
 149. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp. v. Race Tires Am., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012).  
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precedent on the issue has passed for at least one more term. But the dearth 
of appellate cases on point could (and should) lead the district courts of 
other circuits to use Race Tires as a model for their own decisions.150 While 
the future remains uncertain, the signs point toward other circuits adopting 
the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4). 
Some courts have already cited Race Tires approvingly, while others 
have shown a willingness to adopt its reasoning. At present, district courts 
in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have already cited to and 
followed the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Race Tires.151 And the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted the Third Circuit’s approach.152 
Although not unanimous, there is a definite trend toward adopting the 
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) set out in Race Tires. 
Of the circuits that have not yet adopted Race Tires, some simply have 
not had occasion to address it. As of January 2014, no court in the First, 
Second, or D.C. Circuits, at either the appellate or district court level, has 
addressed the definition of “copying” in the last five years. Most of those 
courts’ § 1920(4) cases have focused on exemplification or necessity, rather 
than the nature of a copy and the increasing role of e-discovery vendors.153 
As such, it is not possible at present to determine how those circuits will 
react when presented with the issue. However, given the large number of 
                                                                                                                 
 150. As the Third Circuit itself stated in an earlier case, “Opinions on cost disputes 
seldom reach official reporters.” In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 630 F.2d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 
1980). While many recent appellate cases discuss cost-shifting, they are far more often in the 
context of determining whether the particular amount awarded was an abuse of the district 
court’s discretion. See, e.g., Ford v. Donley, 485 F. App’x 305, 310 (10th Cir. 2012); Little 
Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 602 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 151. See, e.g., Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Sony Electrs. Inc., No. 1:05–CV–
64 TS, 2013 WL 5964288, at *4 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2013); Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 
07-CV-0781-SCW, 2012 WL 4936598, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2012); El Camino Res., Ltd. 
v. Huntington Nat. Bank, No. 1:07-CV-598, 2012 WL 4808741, at *7 (W.D. Mich. May 3, 
2012), report and recommendation approved, No. 1:07-CV-598, 2012 WL 4808736 (W.D. 
Mich. Oct. 10, 2012); Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2012 WL 
4092586, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 19, 2012). 
 152. Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260-61 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
 153. See, e.g., Haemonetics Corp. v. Fenwal, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D. Mass. 
2012) (determining whether computer-generated graphics qualified as both exemplification 
and reasonably necessary); Youssef v. F.B.I., 762 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(interpreting § 1920(4) and a similar local rule regarding copies of exhibits); Hamptons 
Locations, Inc. v. Rubens, No. 01-CV-5477(DRH)(WDW), 2010 WL 3522808, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2010) (discussing whether certified copies of documents that could have 
been, but were not, provided during discovery could be taxed). 
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other courts adopting the Third Circuit’s reasoning, it seems more likely 
than not that all three circuits would follow suit. 
The Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits present a more interesting 
scenario because the courts in those circuits face conflicting precedents. 
Past district court decisions in the Eighth Circuit have followed both the 
broad and narrow interpretations of § 1920(4).154 Recent decisions seem to 
show that district courts in the Eighth Circuit view Race Tires as 
persuasive.155 However, with support for both positions, there is a basis for 
any potential decision a district court could make. Until the appellate court 
takes up the issue, there can be no predicting the results in the Eighth 
Circuit.  
The situation is similar for the Ninth Circuit. There, at least one district 
court rejected Race Tires in favor of a previous Ninth Circuit decision 
employing the broad interpretation.156 However, following the district court 
decision the Supreme Court reversed the appellate precedent on which it 
relied.157 No court in the Ninth Circuit has followed Race Tires explicitly, 
but two recent decisions have followed similar arguments and upheld a 
narrow interpretation of § 1920.158 The conflicting precedents in the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits make prediction in those circuits less accurate, but the 
narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) nonetheless seems to be gaining traction 
in both. 
Courts in the Eleventh Circuit may be attempting to find a middle ground 
between the broad and narrow interpretations. One district court has firmly 
sided with the narrow interpretation espoused by the Third Circuit,159 while 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Compare B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Fastenal Co., No. 4:10–cv–00317–SWW, 2011 
WL 6829625, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 2011) (allowing vendor costs to be recovered) with 
Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A. v. Baptist Health, No. 4:06CV01594 JLH, 2009 WL 
763556, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009) (denying recovery of vendor costs). 
 155. See Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., Nos. 10–0793–CV–W–ODS, 11–
1097–CV–W–ODS, 2013 WL 3336631, at *1 (W.D. Mo. July 2, 2013); Hallmark Cards, 
Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners, Inc., No. 08–0840–CV–W–ODS, 2013 WL 1155245, at *1 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2013); Amana Soc’y, Inc. v. Excel Eng’g, Inc., No. 10–CV–168–LRR, 
2013 WL 427394, at *5-6 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 4, 2013).  
 156. See In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litig., No. M 09–2029 PJH, 2012 WL 
1414111, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (citing Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 633 
F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir. 2011)).  
 157. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2007 (2012). 
 158. See Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., No. C 09–01714 WHA (LB), 2012 WL 
5269667, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10–03561 
WHA, 2012 WL 3822129, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012).  
 159. Finnerty v. Stiefel Labs., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2012). 
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another, older decision fell in line with the broad interpretation.160 The 
Federal Circuit, applying Eleventh Circuit law, adopted the narrow 
interpretation in the main but differed from Race Tires on the subject of 
metadata.161 The court found that the Third Circuit’s classification of 
metadata extraction as unrecoverable under § 1920(4) was too restrictive, 
stating: “It seems to us that there is no good reason, as a default matter, to 
distinguish copying one part of an electronic document (i.e., the part that is 
visible when printed) from copying other parts (i.e., parts not immediately 
visible) when both parts are requested.”162 However, the majority’s 
reasoning faced a stiff dissent on that point, which argued that the majority 
was “rewrit[ing] § 1920(4) to address the increasing cost of electronic 
discovery.”163 After the Federal Circuit’s ruling, it is unclear exactly what 
the boundaries are of this expanded narrow interpretation or whether the 
middle ground interpretation will spread beyond the Eleventh Circuit. 
It is too soon to tell if the narrow interpretation will become the only 
interpretation of § 1920(4), but that day seems fast approaching. Courts in a 
majority of circuits have already adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning, and 
other circuits are likely to do so when the opportunity arises in light of its 
sound reasoning and easy application.164 There are some courts where the 
broad interpretation remains, but it seems to be losing its hold. Although an 
accurate prediction is not wholly possible, the trend among the various 
circuits swings toward embracing the narrow interpretation espoused by 
Race Tires.165  
                                                                                                                 
 160. Klayman v. Freedom’s Watch, Inc., No. 07-22433-CIV, 2008 WL 4194881, at *7 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2008), superseded by statute, Judicial Administration and Technical 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-406, 122 Stat. 4291, as recognized in Finnerty, 
900 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. 
 161. CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., No. 2013–1036, 2013 WL 6510953, 
at *10 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2013). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *13 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164. Country Vintner of N.C., LLC v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, Inc., 718 F.3d 249, 260 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (“The [Third Circuit] properly took into account the statute’s history, its plain 
language, and the Supreme Court’s narrow contemporary interpretation of the costs taxable 
under § 1920.”). 
 165. It is important to remember that the Third Circuit dealt with only one piece of § 
1920(4), the meaning of “copying.” The Court did not deal with the necessity aspect of the 
statute, so circuits may continue to differ in their treatment of § 1920(4) as a whole even if 
all of them adopt the Race Tires interpretation of “copying.” See, e.g., Mann v. Heckler & 
Koch Def., Inc., No. 1:08cv611, 2011 WL 1599580, at *7 (E.D. Virg. Apr. 28, 2011) 
(collecting cases). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss1/5
2014]       NOTE 215 
 
 
B. Potential Consequences of the Narrow Interpretation’s Adoption 
With the majority of courts adopting or likely to adopt a narrow 
interpretation of § 1920(4), the next step is to examine the consequences of 
that adoption for the justice system. As with any issue involving the 
American Rule, the most important consequences revolve around money. 
The Third Circuit closed the door some lawyers were using to secure 
additional funds for their clients. Now, lawyers and their clients will need to 
address a new set of potentially unpleasant issues, including the possibility 
of discovery sanctions, the likelihood of similar rulings in other areas of 
law, and the need for additional clarity in § 1920 motions. 
1. The Narrow Interpretation As the Cause of Discovery Sanctions in E-
Discovery Cases 
The Third Circuit’s decision creates the possibility for discovery 
sanctions against lawyers with clients who cannot afford an e-discovery 
vendor. By requiring all parties to pay for their own expenses, the American 
Rule attempts to prevent a party from forgoing a suit for fear of financial 
ruin if it loses.166 However, by preventing the suit’s winner from securing 
recompense for its e-discovery costs the Third Circuit may unintentionally 
bar poor parties from suits. Parties use vendors’ services because those 
services are almost mandatory in modern cases; that concern was one of the 
bases of the broad interpretation for good reason.167 If a party cannot pay a 
vendor to manage its e-discovery needs, it may not be able to comply with a 
legitimate discovery request or the subsequent order to compel.168 Such a 
failure could open the party to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37.169 While it seems unlikely a judge would levy a major 
penalty for this type of violation,170 even a minor penalty (e.g., a single 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). 
 167. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text. 
 168. Cf. In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650, 661-64 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(finding that failure to meet e-discovery requests merited sanctions, even though attempts at 
production were made). 
 169. The potential sanctions are listed in FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Sanctions often will 
not be given if the party has shown “an impossibility to comply with the discovery orders.” 
In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 170. Many courts approach sanction motions using a multi-factor analysis, with possible 
factors including the reason for the failure to disclose, the prejudice to the other party’s case 
from the non-disclosure, and whether the party was warned that sanctions were a possibility. 
See, e.g., Phelan v. Campbell, No. 12-736, 2013 WL 28361, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2013); 
Universal Health Grp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12-1323, 2013 WL 28363, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 
3, 2013). 
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disputed fact being admitted for the opposing party’s benefit) could prove 
decisive. In essence, preventing cost shifting could lead to parties being 
unable or unwilling to continue a case, for fear of discovery sanctions 
ending their hope of victory. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do have a solution in place to 
permit cost-shifting in these situations, but even that solution is not 
foolproof. Under Rule 26(c), a party can seek an order protecting them from 
an “undue burden or expense” resulting from discovery requests.171 The 
Supreme Court has not addressed cost-shifting under Rule 26(c) in the 
context of e-discovery, but in the past it has affirmed the ability of courts to 
shift costs when necessary while reiterating the importance of the American 
Rule.172 Rule 26(c) was not an issue in Race Tires, as neither party sought a 
cost-shifting order from the court.173 However, when a party seeks a 26(c) 
order in the context of e-discovery, many courts will require it to satisfy the 
two-part Zubulake test.174 At a basic level, the test requires both that the 
data sought be “inaccessible” and that several of seven possible factors be 
present.175 Meeting that burden is certainly not as easily achieved as simply 
presenting one’s financial inability to the court.176 Thus, even though the 
Rules of Civil Procedure create the potential for parties to shift costs and 
                                                                                                                 
 171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 172. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1978). 
 173. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 174. The Zubulake test was conceived as part of a series of cases, the first being 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). A full inspection of the 
Zubulake test is well beyond the scope of this note. 
 175. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The seven 
factors are:  
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant 
information; 
2. The availability of such information from other sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each 
party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information. 
Id. (citing Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324). 
 176. For a discussion of the Zubulake analysis and its potential problems, see generally 
Andrew Mast, Note, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake and 28 U.S.C. § 
1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1825 (2010); John T. Yip, Comment, Addressing the Cost and 
Comity Concerns of International E-Discovery, 87 WASH. L. REV. 595 (2012). 
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avoid sanctions, the solution is not so easily achieved that a party worried 
about paying an e-discovery vendor could rely on it.177 
The Third Circuit’s decision has the definite potential to create problems 
for clients who lack the funds to pay an e-discovery vendor. Without the 
vendor’s help, the party may be sanctioned for not meeting their discovery 
obligations. The broad interpretation of § 1920(4) gave parties the ability to 
force the loser to pay for all e-discovery costs. Thus, the Race Tires 
decision created an increased incentive for cost-shifting during the 
discovery process, as the parties can no longer hope for recovery after a 
victory. However, the uncertainties surrounding the Zubulake test make 
cost-shifting protective orders a dubious refuge. Practitioners and clients 
will need to address this issue in the planning and discovery stages of the 
suit in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of a post-Race Tires judgment. 
2. Race Tires and the Narrowing of the Cost-Shifting Statute 
Another potential consequence of the Third Circuit’s decision could 
come in the form of narrower rulings on other parts of § 1920. As noted 
above, many district courts have already adopted the Third Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation of § 1920(4).178 However, in conjunction with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd.,179 the Third 
Circuit’s decision may serve as the impetus to impose a narrow 
construction on all cost-shifting, or at least that governed by § 1920. Thus, a 
practitioner whose case hinges on the broad interpretation of the word 
“exemplification,” which was not an issue in either Race Tires or 
Taniguchi, now may nevertheless be facing an adverse ruling if the judge 
feels the term should be defined as narrowly as “copy” and “interpreter.”180 
The same could be true for whether, and to what extent, the fees of a private 
process server could be recovered under § 1920(1).181 Together, Taniguchi 
and Race Tires could spell the end of the broad interpretation of any piece 
                                                                                                                 
 177. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit parties from creating an enforceable 
cost-sharing agreement prior to discovery, but even that solution requires pre-planning and 
agreement among the parties. See In re Ricoh Co. Patent Litig., 661 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). In a contentious case like Race Tires, such agreement would have been, at 
the least, unlikely. 
 178. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 179. Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012). 
 180. An example of a case where changing from the broad to narrow interpretation of 
“exemplification” would have been decisive is Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 
428 (7th Cir. 2000).  
 181. Schwartz & Schwartz of Virg., LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, No. 6:07-
CV-00042, 2010 WL 452743, at *3 (W.D. Virg. Feb. 8, 2010) (collecting cases). 
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of § 1920, and practitioners will need to be aware of this potential shift in 
interpretation. 
3. Presenting the Bill to a Narrow Interpretation Court  
One final consequence could be the imposition of tighter requirements 
on the bills that parties present. As noted above, a party must justify its 
motion for cost-shifting under § 1920 by demonstrating the costs fit within 
the statutory limits.182 As the Third Circuit’s ire reveals, some parties’ proof 
of statutory compliance has been to give the court the invoices that they 
were given by their e-discovery vendors.183 However, those bills can be 
vague and confusing, which could lead a court either to deny the motion for 
failure to meet the statutory requirements or to create its own estimate of 
the costs.184 There are two possible paths forward: either pressure the 
vendor to provide a more detailed breakdown of its charges or supplement a 
less-than-adequate bill with additional explanation. In either case, parties 
and their lawyers will need to pay much closer attention to what is on their 
vendor’s bill as a result of Race Tires.  
The Third Circuit’s decision created a variety of possible consequences. 
Attorneys and clients involved in cost-shifting cases will need to exercise 
extra care in order to avoid previously unknown pitfalls. Lawyers in e-
discovery cases will need to factor in the cost of an e-discovery vendor 
when discussing the cost of a suit with their clients, along with the potential 
ramifications of discovery sanctions. Any party attempting to recover costs 
under § 1920 will need to be aware that recent decisions, Race Tires 
prominent among them, make a narrow interpretation of the statute more 
likely than in the past. And parties will need to examine their bills of costs 
much more closely, possibly with some pressure on vendors, to ensure that 
the bills meet statutory requirements. While the Third Circuit’s reasoning in 
Race Tires cannot be faulted, practitioners should not underestimate the 
potential consequences for clients and themselves. 
VI. Conclusion 
With its decision in Race Tires, the Third Circuit explored the definition 
of “copying” in 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Prior to the computer revolution, 
when the dominant medium of discovery was paper, no one questioned 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
 183. Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 166-67 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 233 (2012). 
 184. Bennett, supra note 49, at 552.  
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what a copying cost was—it was the cost to duplicate a piece of paper. The 
proliferation of computers, and the subsequent rise of e-discovery, led some 
courts to expand the meaning of “copy” to include all e-discovery activities 
and vendor costs. In reality, these courts were misguided; as the Third 
Circuit’s opinion shows, the statute is much narrower than such a reading.  
A copy, either paper or electronic, is a duplicate of an original. While the 
means of duplicating an electronic document differ from those used to 
duplicate physical documents, the end result is the same. The Third 
Circuit’s opinion was grounded on this bedrock principle, and its adoption 
of the narrow interpretation of § 1920(4) logically followed. Its decision 
returns an analysis, fraught with traps of modern technology, to its 
traditional roots in the American Rule. It can and does serve as a model for 
other courts, and as such it will have long-lasting consequences for judges, 
lawyers, clients, and vendors. With its holding in Race Tires, the Third 
Circuit crafted a dominant interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) and created 
a cost-shifting precedent that is likely to last until the next technological 
revolution. 
 
Jason L. Callaway 
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